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 Improvements and future challenges for the research infrastructure in the field 
“Measuring cognitive ability” 




The assessment of cognitive abilities is critical in large-scale survey studies that 
aim at elucidating the longitudinal interplay between the individual’s cognitive 
potential and socio-economic variables. The format of such studies calls for 
assessment methods which can not only be administered economically but also 
display a high (psychometric) measurement quality. In consideration of recent 
theoretical and empirical advances in intelligence research, we recommend the 
implementation of tests drawing on working memory in large-scale survey studies. 
Working memory is a limited-capacity system for temporary storage and 
processing of information and currently discussed to be the cognitive key system 
underlying intellectual abilities. Four types of working memory tests are 
exemplarily described and critically evaluated with regard to their psychometric 
quality and the need for further evaluation.  
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  11. Research questions and theoretical developments 
The analyses of gene-environment-interaction and evolution are becoming more and more 
accepted as a research aim in the social sciences (see Spinath, 2008). The basic argument is 
that without the “control” of genetic effects one cannot be sure that he or she estimates 
unbiased socio-economic effects (Guo, 2008, Diewald, 2008). In this context cognitive 
abilities play an important role. Cognitive abilities are the raw material for developing 
individual resources and are promoted as well as constrained by the socio-economic context. 
Research on cognitive abilities has revealed considerable associations between an individual’s 
cognitive abilities (or:“general intelligence”) and numerous indicators of life success, ranging 
from educational and vocational performance over delinquency to morbidity and mortality 
(Jensen, 1998; Deary et al., 2004). The causal nature of most of these correlations is still 
unknown as well as the mediating role of socio-economic variables. This underlines the 
importance of including cognitive ability measurements in large-scale survey studies to 
enhance our knowledge about the longitudinal interplay between individual cognitive 
resources and socio-economic variables.  
1.1. A brief history of cognitive ability assessment 
The first systematic approach to objectively measure cognitive abilities can be traced back to 
Sir Francis Galton at the end of the 19
th century (cf. Jensen, 1998).  Galton developed a 
variety of tests to measure elementary mental functions such as sensory discrimination and 
perception speed, guided by the assumption that differences in intellectual abilities result from 
a differential efficiency of the central nervous system. Galton’s tests were presented to the 
public in his Anthropometric Laboratory at the International Health Exhibition in London. 
The interest into the new anthropometric measurements was enormous; between 1884 and 
1890 data of more than 9000 persons were collected. The validity of the tests for measuring 
cognitive abilities, however, was disappointing. The test results turned out to be only poorly 
correlated with commonsense criteria of intellectual abilities and educational success.  
A more promising approach was pursued by Alfred Binet at the beginning of the 20
th 
century (Binet, 1905). Commissioned by the French Ministry of Public Instruction, he should 
develop a quick and reliable method of distinguishing mentally retarded children, who could 
not be expected to profit from normal instruction in school, from those with mere behaviour 
problems. In contrast to Galton, Binet and his colleague Simon devised a battery of tasks 
drawing on practical knowledge and skills rather than on elementary mental functions. 
Children should point at various parts of their body, name objects seen in a picture, give 
definitions, repeat series of digits or a complete sentence, tell the time of a clock, etc. Besides 
their focus on rather practical skills, Binet and Simon’s approach was innovative in that they 
used the children’s age as an external criterion for cognitive abilities. By empirically 
assigning the tasks to different age groups, their intelligence scales allowed the objective 
assessment whether a child was advanced or backward for his or her chronological age and, 
thus, to distinguish mentally retarded children from others. This comparison of mental with 
chronological age provided the basis for the advent of the intelligence quotient (IQ; Stern, 
1912), until it was replaced by the concept of today’s statistical deviation IQ (Wechsler, 
1944). 
The Binet scales were soon translated and distributed in America and England and became 
the norm against which later intelligence tests were evaluated. The further development of 
intelligence tests was strongly related to the question of the structure of cognitive abilities. At 
a gross level, two different views can be distinguished. Some researchers (e.g., Jensen) 
emphasized the existence and importance of a general intelligence (g) factor, which was 
originally discovered by Spearman (1904). If a large and random sample of participants 
completes a number of diverse cognitive tests, the correlations among the different test scores 
will be almost entirely positive and, in most of the cases, of moderate size. This means that a 
person who does well in one test also has a high probability to achieve a good performance 
level in the other tests. Using statistical methods this correlation pattern can be reduced to one 
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Other researchers (e.g., Thurstone or Gardner), in contrast, questioned the existence of the 
g factor. This diverging view predominantly resulted from the application of different 
statistical methods in analysing cognitive test performance data or from the expansion of the 
intelligence concept to non-academic skills (such as interpersonal and bodily-kinesthetic 
intelligence; Gardner, 1983). 
  At present, there is wide consensus on a hierarchical model of cognitive abilities, 
consisting of three levels of different generality (Carroll, 1993; Gustafsson, 1984): At the top 
and most general level, Spearman’s g factor can be found, reflecting the fact that diverse 
cognitive abilities show near-universal positive correlations.  
At the second level, group factors of cognitive abilities such as fluid and crystallised 
intelligence are located. Fluid intelligence is conceptualised as the ability to solve novel 
problems and is typically assessed by tasks drawing on abstract reasoning (inductive or 
deductive) or complex problem solving. Crystallised intelligence reflects the breadth and 
depth of general knowledge and is usually measured by tests on vocabulary, spelling ability, 
or general information.  
Finally, at the lowest level, there are specific cognitive abilities such as quantitative 
reasoning (for fluid intelligence) or lexical knowledge (for crystallised intelligence), 
accounting for variance that is neither attributable to factor g nor to the group factors. 
Although hierarchical models with g at the top and second- and third-order factors below 
might best describe the structure of individual differences in cognitive abilities, it is also 
widely accepted that most of the predictive value of intelligence tests derives from the g factor 
which is strongly related to fluid intelligence (Brody, 1999; Deary, 1998, Jensen, 1998).  
1.2. Bases of cognitive abilities 
In the past decades, much research has been conducted to better understand the bases of 
individual differences in cognitive abilities. At present, two cognitive components are 
discussed which show consistent associations with intelligence and might, therefore, be 
considered as potential bases of human intelligence. The first component is mental speed (cf. 
Neubauer, 1995). There is a large body of evidence showing consistent negative associations 
between intelligence and reaction times in so-called elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs). ECTs 
are designed to place only minimal requirements on the participant and, thus, are less likely to 
be influenced by differential strategies or prior knowledge. As an example, in the letter-
matching task by Posner and Mitchell (1967), the participants have to judge whether two 
letters are semantically identical or not (e.g., semantically identical: “Aa” or “AA” vs. 
semantically different: “Ab” or “AB”). In a meta-analysis, Neubauer (1995) reported an 
average correlation of -.33  between mean reaction times and psychometric intelligence test 
scores. This suggests that brighter individuals display a higher speed of information 
processing than less intelligent individuals, probably due to a more efficient functioning of 
their central nervous systems (Jensen, 1998). A central restriction of ECTs represents the 
rather low effect sizes of the observed correlations. In most cases, correlations do not exceed 
absolute values of .30; a recent meta-analysis reports a mean correlation of -.24 (Sheppard & 
Vernon, 2008). Thus, mental speed usually accounts for scarcely more than 10 % of the 
variance in intelligence tests.  
The second potential basis of individual differences in cognitive abilities is working 
memory. Working memory (WM) can be regarded as a limited-capacity system responsible 
for temporary storage (or maintenance) and processing of information (Baddeley, 2002, 
2003). The inclusion of a processing component distinguishes WM from short-term memory 
(STM) which only supports temporary storage of information. As an example, in a 
prototypical STM task (forward span), two to nine words are presented sequentially, and the 
participants are required to recall the words afterwards in the same order. WM tests usually 
require the execution of a second, additional task. In the original reading span task, for 
instance, participants read aloud sentences while trying to remember the last word of each 
sentence for later recall (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Individuals differ in the capacity of 
WM, and these differences have proven to be related to several higher-order cognitive 
functions ranging from rather domain-specific skills (like reading comprehension; Daneman 
& Carpenter, 1980; vocabulary learning; Daneman & Green, 1986; or numeracy; De 
Rammelaere et al., 1999) to (domain-general) intelligence. The actual size of correlation 
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determine the true relationship are matters of intensive debate (Ackerman et al., 2005; Beier 
& Ackerman, 2005; Kane et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2005). The current estimates range 
between about .40 and .80; single previous studies reported even higher correlations (up to 
.96) which led some authors to conclude that WM may be the psychological mechanism 
underlying (fluid) intelligence (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Colom et al., 2004).  
The distinction between storage and processing is also reflected in cognitive theories of 
WM. Probably the most prominent theory was put forward by Baddeley and colleagues 
already in the 1970s (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). According to their tripartite model, WM 
consists of two “slave systems” which are coordinated and controlled by a third system, the 
so-called central executive. The slave systems enable the temporary storage of information 
and are domain-specific: Phonologically coded material (verbal and numerical material) is 
maintained in the phonological loop, visuo-spatial information in the visuo-spatial sketchpad.  
The central executive component was considered as an attention control mechanism which is 
responsible for focussing attention to (task-) relevant information, dividing attention if two 
tasks are performed, and switching attention between different processes and information 
(Baddeley, 2002).   
There is considerable evidence that the central executive component of WM is domain-
independent and drives the relationship between WM capacity and intelligence (e.g., Engle et 
al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004; but see also Colom et al., 2005). More specifically, Conway and 
colleagues (2003) regarded the “active maintenance of goal-relevant information in the face 
of interference” (p. 549) as the critical cognitive basis that is shared between intelligence and 
WM tasks. Support for their view comes from findings that individuals with high and low 
WM capacity also differ in the performance of low-level attention-control tasks that place 
practically no memory demands to the participants. In the anti-saccade task, for example, 
participants have to make an eye-movement (saccade) in the opposite direction of a visual cue 
(e.g., a flashing light in the periphery). Since the reflexive response would be to orient 
towards the cue, the attention control demand consists of suppressing this habitual response. 
Individuals with higher WM capacity were found to display faster and more correct saccades 
than individuals with lower WM capacity.  
2. Status quo 
At present, numerous psychometric “intelligence tests” are available. Virtually all of the 
currently available market tests do a good job at measuring individual differences in cognitive 
abilities in that they meet the main criteria that are required for a psychometric test, i.e., 
objectivity, reliability, and validity.  
A test displays objectivity if the result is independent of the person who administrates, 
analyses, and interprets the participant’s performance. Objectivity is ensured by standardised 
instructions during administration as well as by clear-cut instructions of how the test scores 
are determined and interpreted.  
Reliability builds upon objectivity and reflects the measurement precision of a test. 
Reliability is never perfect (1.0) as the test performance is not only influenced by the true 
cognitive ability of the person but also by random factors such as momentary fluctuations of 
attention or mood, fatigue, etc. Usually, intelligence tests display reliabilities around .90, 
indicating that 10 % of the total variance in test performance is due to random factors (i.e., 
measurement error) and 90 % reflects true variance in intelligence.  
Finally, the validity of a test reflects to what extent the test measures the trait or ability that 
it should measure. The validity of intelligence tests is typically evaluated by relating the 
performance in the test under investigation to an external criterion, either to the performance 
in a well-established intelligence test or to criteria such as school grades. The large success of 
the concept intelligence primarily originates in the high validity of intelligence test 
performance for a lot of performance indicators in diverse areas of life (cf. Jensen, 1998).  
In line with the originally intended purpose of intelligence tests, the strongest associations 
are found with educational variables. Intelligence correlates with school grades at about .50 
and with years of education at about .55 (Neisser et al., 1996). Intelligence can also be 
regarded as a good predictor of vocational success; in a meta-analysis Schmidt and Hunter 
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criterion of psychometric tests is the availability of norms so that the individual test 
performance can be compared with the performance of an age-matched reference sample. The 
norms in intelligence tests allow the determination of the IQ, reflecting the standardised 
position of an individual relative to a reference population with a mean of 100 and a standard 
deviation of 15.  
Given their high reliability and validity, intelligence tests can be definitely regarded as the 
best choice to assess cognitive abilities. Many of the available market tests do not only 
provide an estimate of the general intelligence of an individual (the IQ) but also inform about 
his or her cognitive ability structure. The Berlin Intelligence Structure Test (BIS-T; Jäger et 
al., 1987), for instance, assesses three content facets (verbal, numerical, spatial-figural) and 
four operational facets (processing capacity, creativity, memory, and speed) of cognitive 
abilities with general intelligence as the integral of all ability facets.  
The administration of such an intelligence structure test, however, is very costly, 
predominantly in terms of time. The full version of the BIS-T takes over 2 hours. But even 
one-dimensional intelligence tests focusing on general intelligence such as the Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1958) require a test time of at least 20-30 minutes in 
their short version. Thus, if we want to disentangle the impacts of cognitive abilities and 
socio-economic effects on outcomes of human lives there is a strong need for the 
development of more short cognitive ability assessment procedures that can be applied in 
large-scale surveys.  
Lang and colleagues (2007) recently proposed two ultra-short tests for the measurement of 
intellectual abilities in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). One test (the symbol-digit 
test; SDT) requires the fast assignment of numbers to symbols following a pre-defined 
number-symbol pairing. In the other test (the Animal Naming Task; ANT), participants have 
to produce as many animal names as possible within a 90 second time interval. The 
reliabilities of both tests were reported to be around .90 for the SDT and around .65 for the 
ANT. Their validities for general intelligence however, were not investigated, but can be 
expected to be rather low. The SDT draws on mental speed, and the performance in similar 
task versions was found to be only weakly related to intelligence (Conway et al., 2002). 
Likewise, the ANT only samples knowledge in a certain domain which turned out to be 
correlated only between .33 and .39 with broader vocabulary knowledge (Lang et al., 2007).  
3. Future developments 
In consideration of the recent theoretical insights on the cognitive bases of intelligence and 
the consistent strong relationship between WM (Working Memory) capacity scores and 
higher-order intellectual abilities, it appears most promising to further develop short tests 
drawing on WM or its sub-components. In contrast to intelligence problems, WM tasks 
typically require only simple cognitive operations whose sequence is highly restricted by the 
instructions. The difficulty of working-memory tasks arises from the additional load on some 
facets of the cognitive architecture (Süß et al., 2002). The reading-span task described above, 
for example, requires continuous updating of the content of WM (with every sentence one 
new word needs to be memorised) and the maintenance of the words in spite of interference 
(i.e., reading sentences aloud).   
   Overall, WM tests offer the following advantages: 
(a) Their administration takes shorter time than that of intelligence tests.  
 
(b) Most of these tasks can be implemented in computer-aided testing environments. 
 
(c) According to the current view in research, they tap the central basis of cognitive  
abilities. 
 
(d) WM tasks are typically less influenced by prior knowledge than intelligence tests. 
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(e) The limiting factor of WM capacity (central executive) seems to be domain-
independent.  
 
To date, the development of WM tests is by far not as advanced as the development of 
intelligence tests. WM span tasks (such as the reading span task described above) belong to 
the first WM measures that have been developed and are meanwhile already well-understood 
which is reflected in the existence of methodological reviews and user’s guides (Conway et 
al., 2005). The psychometric quality of other WM tasks (e.g., focusing on executive 
processes) is more difficult to evaluate due to the scarcity of studies with larger samples. In 
the following, an overview of WM tasks that could be employed in the large-scale survey 
studies is provided.  
3.1. Traditional WM span tasks 
Since the early reading span task described above, several versions of WM span tasks have 
been developed. Three key tasks can be identified (Conway et al., 2005; Kane et al., 2004). In 
the (newer version of the) reading span task, the participant is presented with a meaningful or 
meaningless sentence and a to-be-remembered letter (e.g., “We were fifty lawns out at sea 
before we lost sight of land. ? X”). Participant’s task is to read the sentence, judge whether it 
makes sense or not, read and remember the letter. The operation span task requires judging 
the correctness of an arithmetic equation and to remember an additionally presented word 
(e.g., “Is (6 x 2) – 5 = 7? class”). In the counting span task participants have to count the 
number of dark blue circles in displays with other distracting objects (dark blue squares and 
green circles) and to remember the counted number. All these tasks are designed to force 
storage of information in the face of processing.  
Conway et al. (2005) emphasised three critical task features:  First, rehearsal must be 
avoided by presenting the next stimulus immediately after completion of the preceding one. 
Second, the timing of the task needs to be adaptive. Both properties are met in current 
computer versions in which the to-be-remembered stimulus is displayed immediately after 
completion of the interfering task (e.g., judging the correctness of an equation). Third, the 
number of stimuli within one item needs to be sufficient. A range from two to five stimuli per 
item turned out to be adequate for most college students.  
The administration of a WM span task with 12 items (with two to five stimuli each) 
including instruction and practice items takes about 10 minutes. Besides the verbal WM span 
measures described above, a number of figural-spatial versions have been devised (Kane et 
al., 2004). As an example, in the symmetry span task, participants have to judge whether a 
figure in an 8 x 8 matrix is symmetrical or not and to remember the position of a red square in 
a subsequently presented 4 x 4 matrix.  
The reliabilities of WM span tasks are usually in the range between .70 and .90, 
suggesting good measurement precision for a single test. Their validity for intelligence test 
performance lies around .50 (Kane et al., 2004).  
3.2. Transformation span tasks 
In this type of WM tasks, participants are not required to simultaneously store and process 
information but rather to perform some mental transformation on the stored information. A 
promising example is the alpha span task, originally developed by Craik (1986). Three to 
seven words are successively presented to the participant who is required to memorise them. 
After presenting the last word, the participant has to repeat the first letter of each word in 
alphabetical order, thus, requiring an alphabetical re-ordering of the memorised words. Süß et 
al. (2002) presented one item with three words and two items with four, five, six, and seven 
words each, requiring an estimated test time of about 5 minutes including instruction.  
The authors reported a reliability of .81 and a validity for general intelligence of .55. Other 
studies, however, report much lower validities for similar transformation tasks (e.g., the 
backward span task requiring the recall of the presented words in reverse order; Engle et al., 
1999). 
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A separate class of WM tasks that are frequently used in neuroscience research require the 
continuous monitoring and updating of the maintained information. In the prominent n-back 
task, a list of stimuli (words, numbers, or figures) is successively presented, and the individual 
has to continuously report whether each stimulus matches the one that had appeared n items 
ago (n-back). In a 2-back task, for instance, participants have to continuously maintain the last 
2 stimuli of the list which means that they have to update the content of their WM with every 
new stimulus and to drop out the least recent one. Even though the n-back task is considered 
the gold standard in neuroscience research, there is mixed empirical evidence on the question 
whether this task draws on the same cognitive resources as the well-established WM span 
tasks (Conway et al., 2005; Kane et al., 2007).  
Kane et al. (2007) investigated the construct validity of the n-back task in a sample of 129 
young adults and found that the performance in the operation span task and the n-back task 
was only weakly associated (correlations did not exceed .25). In addition, both tasks 
accounted for independent variance in general intelligence. These findings suggest that the n-
back task does not measure the same WM processes as the operation span task.  
3.4. Executive control tasks 
Executive processes related to attentional control are central in Baddeley’s model of WM and 
are assumed to play a critical role in the relationship between WM capacity and intelligence. 
The development of tasks demanding these processes without strong reliance on storage, 
however, appears to be a great challenge. Süß et al. (2002) as well as Oberauer et al. (2003) 
have devised tasks requiring task set switching, i.e., the inhibition of an active action schema 
and the selection of another. In the numerical switching task by Süß et al. (2002), displays 
with varying number of digits are presented. The participant is required to alternate between 
reading the digits and counting them; which task was to perform was displayed on the top of 
the display. In the figural version, a round and an angular figure appears in each display, one 
left and one right. Participants have to indicate the side of either the angular or the round 
figure. Finally, in the verbal version, participants have to switch between two semantic 
categories in determining the presentation side of words. Similar to the transformation span 
tasks, these tasks can be administered within a few minutes.  
Süß et al. (2002) report reliabilities between .78 (numerical) to .94 (verbal and figural) and 
validities between .33 (figural) and .58 (numerical) for general intelligence. Later research, 
however, has questioned the construct validity of these tasks as they are only weakly related 
to traditional WM span tasks (Oberauer et al., 2003, 2005) and reflect processing speed more 
strongly than reasoning abilities (Süß et al., 2002).  
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
In the past decades, considerable advances have taken place in understanding the individual 
differences in cognitive abilities and in the development of psychometric tests for ability 
assessment. Present research regards WM (Working Memory), reflecting a limited-capacity 
system supporting temporary storage and processing of information, as the cognitive key 
system underlying intellectual abilities.  
Measures of WM capacity have been found to display substantial correlations with several 
domain-specific intellectual abilities as well as with intelligence, representing the epitome of 
domain-general cognitive abilities. Thus, tests assessing WM capacity or executive functions 
appear to be a more promising method for the cognitive ability assessment in large-scale 
survey studies than tests focusing on mental speed or surface knowledge in a certain domain.  
Several candidate tasks have been described above which can be administered in 
considerably shorter time than psychometric intelligence tests. In addition, their task 
characteristics allow the presentation in computer-aided testing environments. The internet 
seems to offer the ideal infrastructure for the implementation of the cognitive ability 
screening. The coverage is very high, and it is meanwhile not longer only accessible from the 
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personal computer (at home or at the office) but increasingly also from mobile devices such as 
netbooks, mobile phones, or personal digital assistants (PDA). So it becomes more and more 
easy to administer those tests in large-scale surveys.1  
However, it should be noted that most of these WM tasks are still in the phase of 
development, and studies with larger samples, which would allow a more accurate evaluation 
of their reliability and (construct) validity, are very scarce. Thus, some starts would be very 
helpful. Although the future challenge is to improve the psychometric quality of these tests 
they should be administered in large-scale surveys. In fact, the data of the large-scale surveys 
can further contribute to their improvement. The actual reliability of these tests could be 
accurately quantified and norms for age-matched reference samples, which are presently 
almost completely missing for WM tests, could be easily established. In addition, the data 
from large-scale studies can also inform about their validity for indicators of life success. 
Parallel to these criteria, their validity for intelligence needs to be further investigated. 
 
1   The tests could be offered and advertised, for instance, in virtual social networks such as Facebook.   9
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